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Abstract: 
APPROXIMATE DEDUCTION 
IN SINGLE EVIDENTIAL BODIES1 
Enrique H. Ruspini 
Artificial Intelligence Center 
SRI International 
Menlo Park, CA 940£5, U.S.A. 
Results on approximate deduction in the context of the calculus of evidence of Dempster-Shafer 
and the theory of interval probabilities are reported. 
Approximate conditional knowledge about the truth of conditional propositions was assumed 
available and expressed as sets of possible values (actually numeric intervals) of conditional probabil­
ities. Under different interpretations of this conditional knowledge, several formulas were produced 
to integrate unconditioned estimates (assumed given as sets of possible values of unconditioned 
probabilities) with conditional estimates. These formulas are discussed together with the compu­
tational characteristics of the methods derived from them. 
Of particular importance is one such evidence integration formulation, produced under a belief­
oriented interpretation, which incorporates both modus ponens and modus tollens inferential mecha­
nisms, allows integration of conditioned and unconditioned knowledge without resorting to iterative 
or sequential approximations, and produces elementary mass distributions as outputs using similar 
distributions as inputs. 
1 Introduction 
This paper presents results of research on conditionalization issues in the the evidential theory 
of Dempster-Shafer [1] and the theory of interval probabilities [3,4]. In the context of our work, 
the term conditionalization is used to denote the processes by which quantitative estimates of the 
conditional truth of certain propositions (i.e., produced under the assumption of truth of other 
propositions) are used to refine existing, a priori, estimates of unconditioned propositional truth. 
In this discussion, the conditioning information is assumed to consist of a number of conditional 
propositions (i.e., propositions of the type "if P then Q. ") having associated probability values 
p( P ___. Q) 2 which lie in some subinterval of the [0, 1] interval of the real line. In addition, the scope 
of this paper is limited to approximate deduction within single evidential bodies. In this context, 
deduction is the process of combining unconditioned estimates of possible propositional probability 
values with their conditional counterparts. 
In that sense, the problem being considered is different from that leading to results such as 
the Dempster's Combination Formula [2] which results in a consensual quantitative value of propo­
sitional truth estimates produced under different, independent, evidential background conditions. 
In our case, both unconditioned and conditioned estimates are assumed to be valid within the 
context provided by a single body of evidence. In most practical applications, the unconditioned 
estimates are the result of analysis of background evidence while conditional estimates (i.e., ap­
proximate knowledge provided by domain experts) usually have a much wider scope of validity. The 
1This research was sponsored in part by the U.S. Army Signal Warfare Center under contract DAAL02-85-C-0082 
by the National Science Foundation under contract NSF DCR-85-13139. 
�Interpreted throughout this paper as being equivalent to the conditional probability p(P /Q). 
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certainty factors of MYCIN [5] are examples of conditional truth estimates (albeit in different truth 
representation and manipulation frameworks). 
The major objective of the research being reported was the extension of approximate deduction 
techniques (i .e. use of approximate rules) to frameworks where uncertainty and ignorance are 
properly differentiated, and where incorporation of additional information within an evidential 
framework results in a decrease of the ignorance about propositional truth (the decrease being null 
only when irrelevant conditional information is considered). 
In addition, other objectives of this research included: 
1. The use of other deductive procedures (e.g., modus tollens) in addition to those typically 
implemented within expert systems with approximate reasoning capabilities (primarily ex­
tensions of modus ponens). 
2. The use of both conditioned and unconditioned estimates as joint constraints on the values 
of valid probability distributions (valuations) on a propositional lattice. 
3. The use of proper reference classes [6] to propagate constraints between antecedent and con­
sequent propositions in a conditional propositional statement (i.e., if it is known that x -+ y 
and that z1, z2, .. · , Zn are true should one use p( xI y) or p( xI y, z1, z2, .. · , Zn) to propagate 
evidence?). 
4. The development of deductive algorithms that properly use constraints defined by interval­
valued truth estimates producing results that are not affected by changes in the implicit or 
explicit inferential control structure . 
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Beliefs and Envelopes 
Differences between probability envelopes and Shafer's belief functions are first discussed as a nec­
essary prerequisite for the understanding of conditionalization results discussed below. 
Probability Envelopes of a convex fami�y C of probability functions in a propositional lattice L 3 
are bounds satisfied by elements of C that cannot be improved without finding members of C which 
do not satify the improved bounds: 
Definition: The function b : L -+ [0, 1] is said to be a probability envelope for the set of 
probability functions C in L, if and only if for every x in L, there exists a probability function Pz 
in C such that: 
(a) Pz(x) = b(x), 
(b) Pz(Y) � b(y), for ally in L. 
Belief functions, on the other hand, are characterized in terms of mappings between a space 
of possible worlds and a propositional space [2]. Belief functions are real functions induced in the 
image propositional space by probability distributions in the domain of the mapping. From the 
perspective of suc}l a mapping, belief functions generalize the logical characterization of probabilities 
of Carnap (as additive measures over spaces of possible worlds) to logics accepting three values of 
3Throughout this paper, probabilities will be treated either as valuations on a complemented lattice, or alterna­
tively as real functions defined over subsets of some space depending on the particular discussion context. 
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propositional truth (i.e., true, false, possible ). It is straightforward to see that belief functions 
are envelopes. 
In what follows, the expression support function will be used to denote either belief function 
or probability envelope whenever the stated results apply to functions in either of those functional 
classes. 
2.2 Specifi.ty 
The frameworks studied in this paper for the representation of imprecision and uncertainty allow 
explicit representation of the degree of ignorance about probability values by means of subintervals 
of the [0, 1] interval of the real line. Different estimates can be partially ordered according to their 
specificity , i.e. their ability to precisely specify the unknown probability values: 
Definition: If b1 and b2 are support functions in the propositional lattice L then then b1 is 
said to be more specific than b2 if and only if b1(x) � b2(x), for all x in L. 
This notion of specificity, due to Yager [7], is important to understand the purpose of any 
evidence combination procedure, that of reducing uncertainty about the state of systems being 
modeled or observed. It can be informally said that the purpose of evidence aggregation is the 
derivation of evidence which is more specific (i.e., provides a more detailed characterization of 
possible states) than each of the evidential bodies being combined. 
2.3 Conditional Information 
The major objective of the research work reported in this paper was the identification and study 
of algorithms that combine a support function b defined in a lattice L with information on the 
validity of conditional propositions (i.e., knowledge about the probability of x-+ y, where x and y 
are elements of L) in order to determine a more specific (i.e improved ) support function b. 
Conditional information is assumed to be given in the form of a function c (called a conditional 
evidence or a conditional support function) such that 
c: L x L -+  [0, 1] , 
and 
(a) c(·, y) : L -+  [0, 1] is a support function if y =I= 0 or y =I= e, 4 
(b) c(x,y) = c(x/\y,y) ify=/= 0. 
Two alternative interpretations of the notion of conditional evidence will be discussed. First, in 
the case of interval probabilities, the functional value c(x, y )  may be regarded as a lower bound on 
the value of the conditional probability p(xjy). Second, in a belief function context, the function c 
indicates the amount of belief that shall be committed to the truth of a proposition solely on the 
knowledge that another proposition is true. 
4Following customary practice in Dempster-Shafer theory we denote the infimum and the supremum of L by 0 
and e, respectively. 
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2.4 Consistence 
Informally, an unconditioned support function b and a conditional evidence function c are consistent 
whenever the information provided by c cannot be used to improve (i.e. make more specific) the 
space of possible probability values defined by b. 
In general such consistence will not be present whenever an arbitrary support function b (repre­
senting background knowledge on the truth of elementary propositions) is considered together with 
domain knowledge relating possible values of probabilities for different propositions5. The purpose 
of any procedure to combine conditioned and unconditioned information may therefore be thought 
of as the production of a more specific support function b that is consistent with the conditional 
knowledge c. 
3 Conditional Probability Constraints 
3.1 Consistence Considerations 
If the interpretation of conditional support is restricted to be one of lower bounds on conditional 
probabilities, then, informally, a support function b and a conditional support function c are consis­
tent if the minimum value that can be attained by a conditional probability under the constraints 
specified by b is larger than the corresponding value specified by c. 
In order to provide more flexibility to the definition of consistence, it will be assumed that 
an additional hypothesis set )I 6 has been specified to further constrain the extent of possible 
probability distributions. With this consideration in mind, consistence between support functions 
can be defined in the following way: 
Definition: The support functions b and c are said to be consistent under )I if and only if 
�n{[p(x/y)]2:: c(x, y), 
' 
for all x, y in L. 
Under consistence, therefore, all probability functions that satisfy both the constraints p(x) 2:: 
b(x) for all x in L, and the additional hypotheses )I, are such that the corresponding conditional 
probability values p(xjy) satisfy: 
p(x 1\ y) 
p(xjy) = 
p(y) 
2:: c(x, y), x,y in L. 
If b and c are consistent then the unconditioned bounds defined by b cannot be improved as 
the conditional information does not provide any new additional knowledge. If, on the other hand, 
b and c are not consistent then the bounds may be improved by modification of b to yield a new 
support function b. This improved function is necessarily more specific than b 7. 
50therwise, the conditional knowledge would add no new information and there would be no purpose to use it in 
the context of a knowledge-billed 6'fl6tem. 
6For example, it may be known that certain propositions in L are independent. 
7 Clearly any improvement in either c or b will lead to support functions which should be more specific than 
either of them (as addition of knowledge cannot lead to more ignorance) . Improving c, however, does not alleviate 
the inability to meet conditional bounds required by the definition of consistence. This situation can be remedied, 
however, by making b more specific thus reflecting the conditional information provided by c. 
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3.2 Generalization of a Bayesian Identity 
If p is a probability defined in the lattice L, a well known identity asserts that 
p(x) = p(xjy)p(y) + p(xjy)(1- p(y)) , 
for all x in L, and for all y in L such that 0 < p(y) < 1. 
(1) 
Now, if b and c are unconditioned and conditional support functions, respectively, it follows at 
once that any probability p consistent with them will satisfy: 
p(x) � c(x, y)p(y) + c(x, y)(1- p(y)) , 
and since b(y) � p(y) � 1- b(y) , then 
p(x) � min [c(x, y)a + c(x, y)(1- a)] , a 
where the minimum is taken over real a satisfying b(y) � a � 1 - b(y) . Since this inequality must 
be satisfied for all p consistent with b and c it makes sense to require that 
b(x) �min [c(x, y)a + c(x, y)(1- a)] , a (2) 
where b(y) � a� 1- b(y). 
Equation (2) is therefore a generalization of the identity (1) which is of considerable importance 
in approximate deduction since support functions b and c that satisfy equation (2) can be seen to 
retain, at a probabilistic level, the important relationships between truth values of antecedent and 
consequent propositions in implications in two-valued logic, which is the basis for the inferential 
processes of modus ponens and modus tollens. 
3.3 Optimistic Case 
In studying possible interpretations to be made of the relationship between consistent support 
functions b and c it is interesting to consider only certain probability distributions that satisfy 
additional hypotheses )/ which restrict the number of possible probability functions b that may 
need to be considered. 
One such interesting sets of hypothesis )/ is that that regards knowledge of the certainty of a 
proposition y as requiring that the unconditioned bounds b be modified so that 
b(y) = 0,  b(x !\ y) = b(x V y)- b(y) , 
where b indicates the refined bounds. Such an assumption, is equivalent, in the case of belief 
functions, to the replacement {under the assumption of truth of a proposition y) of the mapping r 
by the refined mapping r !\ y. In other words, if a state which was compatible with a proposition 
x has a possibility of being compatible with y (i.e., x !\ y =I= 0) then it is compatible with x !\ y (i.e., 
we ignore the possibility that the true state may be in x A y). 
Under such an optimistic assumption, support functions b and c will be consistent if and only if 
over all x, y in L such that b(y) < 1. 
b(x v y) - b(y) > 
( ) 
1 - b(y) -
c x, y ' 
219 
(3) 
It can be further seen that in this case, 
b(z) � rna_!{ [b(y)(l - c(z, y)) + c(z, y)] . 
v:2:z 
This 
A 
equation is also the basis for a fast iterative method to derive (from a given b) the least 
specific b which is more specific than b and consistent with c (under the optimistic assumptions) . 
Although the optimistic assumption is of particular interest since the expression in the left 
hand side of the equation (3) is that obtained when using the Dempster combination formula to 
combine the given b with a simple support function focused in y, consistent functions under that 
assumption may, however, fail to satisfy the equation (2) which assures proper generalization of 
the relationships between truth values of antecedent and consequent in two valued logic. 
3.4 General Case 
If no additional assumptions are made (i.e. )I is empty) then it can be seen that consistence, in 
this most general and unrestricted case, is equivalent to the inequalities 
b(xt\y) 
l + b(xAy)-b(xvy) 
�c(x,y), 
for all x, y in L such that b(y) < 1. 
(4) 
It can also be seen that the left hand side of the Equation (3) is always larger than the left hand 
side of the above equation indicating, as expected, that it is easier for two support functions b and 
c to be consistent under the optimistic assumption rather than in the general case where the left 
hand side of equation (4) is the lowest possible value that may be taken by p(xfy} if pis bounded 
by below by b. Further, support functions that satisfy ( 4) satisfy also the extensions to interval 
probabilities (equation (2)) of the Bayes identity (1), thus guaranteeing the proper relationships 
between b(x),b(y} and c(x,y). 
4 Belief-Based Interpretations 
The last part of this paper deals with alternative interpretations of the notion of conditional support 
which apply solely to unconditioned and conditional support functions which are belief functions. 
Under these interpretations, the conditioned support function cis considered to be a family of 
quantitative rules for the redistribution of ignorance (represented by the multi valued mapping r that 
underlies Dempster's theoretical formalism) . The basic idea is that that the elementary conditional 
mass functions mv(x) associated with the conditional supports c(x,y) provide quantitative mecha­
nisms to redistribute the mass associated with the sets {s E S: r(s} = y }  and {s E S: r(s) � y }, 
by redefinition of the mapping r. 
These interpretations result in the derivation of straightforward, non-iterative formulas for 
the production of more specific, consistent, unconditioned supports b. Further, under one of the 
interpretations discussed below, the resulting improved support function b is also a belief function 
thus assuring that results of the conditionaliza.tion process remain within the theoretical framework 
of the Dempster-Shafer theory. 
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4.1 Conditional Mappings 
Consistent with Dempster's theoretical formalism we assume the existence of a probability space 
{S,O,P}, where, for simplicity, it will be assumed that Sis finite and that 0 is its power set. It is 
also assumed that there exists a nonvoid set T and a multivalued mapping r : S -+ T. From these 
structures, it is possible to define belief and basic probability or mass functions: 
where xis a subset ofT. 
b(x) = P({s E S: r(s) s; x}), 
m(x) = P({sES:r(s)=x}) , 
Extending the basic Dempster-Shafer formalism, we shall also assume that there exists an 
ordinary mapping 
r :S-+T, 
such that r(s) E r(s). The mapping r, called the truth function is used in our formalism to 
represent the true proposition (represented by a point ofT) associated with each possible state of 
the world s in S 8. It is also necessary to introduce the truth sets T11 = { 8 E S : r( 8) E y}, where 
y is a non void proper subset of T. 
It will be then assumed that there exist for each such y there exists a multivalued mapping: 
r11 :T11-+T, 
such that the following set identity is true for all nonvoid proper subsets u and v ofT such that 
us; v: 
{s E s: rv (8) =X and 8 E Tv} =.{8 E s: r u (8) =X n u and 8 E Tu}' 
whenever x s; v 9• 
4.2 Conditional Beliefs as Simple Bounds 
If now c(., y) : y -+ [0, 1] is defined as the belief function (in y s; T) associated with r 1110 and it is 
further required that 
for all proper non void y s; T, then it can be seen that the most specific probability lower bound 
consistent with c which improves b is given by: 
b(x) = sup [L b(u)c(x,u)- inf[c(v,x)p(P)], 
P(T)ueP vEP 
where the supremum is taken over all partitions P of T, and where 
p(P) = 1- L b(v). 
vEP 
8This function is, of coul'8e, unknown. The mapping r is the modeling tool used to represent our actual knowledge 
of po66ible propositions consistent with a. 
9The rationale for this equality dem�ding some corui6tence between conditional mapping6 falls outside the scope 
of the limited discussion of this paper. 
10This function may be extended to all ofT by means of the equality c (z, !I) = c (z n y, y). 
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4.3 Mass Based Interpretation 
If, on the other hand, we interpret the conditional belief functions c(., y) in terms of their associated 
masses my ( x) as constraining the conditional mappings r 11 and the truth sets T11 so that: 
m11(x) = P(r 11(s) = x n yjT11), 
for x � T, then the most specific belief consistent with the unconditioned belief b (and its associated 
mass distribution m) , is given by: 
m(x) = m(x) + 
+ L m(y)(sup[inf(mu(x))])-
u>z P(ll) uEP 
m(x) L sup[ inf (mu(z))], 
z<z P(:z:) uEP 
where the P(u) indicates all partitions of the subset u ofT. 
Unlike the case with the previous interpretation, use of this formula results in a procedure that 
is guaranteed to produce a belief function as an output. This output is produced in a single pass 
of the above formula (i.e., not through an iterative procedure). In addition this formula leads 
to methods that produce mass distributions using as inputs mass distributions thus avoiding the 
computational complexity problems associated with direct manipulation of belief functions. These 
efficient computation mechanisms also incorporate (as was the case with all other expressions 
above) both modus ponens and modus toll ens mechanisms for the derivation of improved estimates 
of possible truth values. 
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